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  As a result of polarizing election outcomes, controversial legislative actions, and the 
general stigma that elected officials are corrupt, many Americans are questioning whether their 
representatives in government have the best interest of their constituents at heart, or are considering 
more self-centered motives. One point of contention is that political action committees and 
lobbyists contribute hundreds of thousands of dollars to legislators’ campaigns in return for 
consideration of their viewpoints. This study seeks to determine exactly how much weight 
members of the House of Representatives give to monetary contributions when considering how 
to vote on a bill by using voting records and control variables associated with the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act.  
 After testing how party, ideology, monetary contributions, constituent income, percent of 
votes received in the election, and the size of the election margin impacted how each 
Representative voted on the ACA it was unclear whether any variables had significant impacts on 
the dependent variable. However, when only the data from the Democrats was considered, it was 
possible to conclude that both ideology and monetary contributions were major contributing 
factors for the vote.   
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 The political system in the United States of America has fallen under more and more 
scrutiny in recent years, especially in light of the 2016 election. A growing number of Americans 
report feelings of mistrust toward the government and many citizens take it as fact that their 
representatives do not have their best interests at heart. Other constituents see legislators as purely 
divided by party lines, more cogs in a political machine than free-thinking delegates. A more 
menacing theory is that representatives and their votes are swayed primarily by monetary 
contributions from interest groups pushing political agendas. 
 To determine whether or not this is true, it is important to determine which factors most 
impact how a member of the House of Representatives chooses to vote. Extensive research has 
been done on this topic due to the far-reaching impact of the outcomes of Congressional voting. 
Previous research has suggested that party affiliation, proximity to election season, constituent 
interests, interest group contributions, personal ideology, and voter preferences are the variables 
which most likely influence congressional votes.  
 This study builds upon previous research by using data specific to the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act to determine which elements were most important during the decision-
making process for that specific piece of legislation. This bill was chosen due to it being arguably 
the most controversial bill of recent years and one which directly impacted many citizens. This 
divisive piece of legislation is particularly fascinating because it seems that the most contentious 
issues are those that most heavily impact the American people.  
 To determine the extent to which monetary contributions influence how congressional 
representatives vote on key issues, data on the amount of money contributed to the campaigns of 
each representative identified as originating within the health sector was obtained. Also, 
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Congressional Representatives’ previous votes were taken into consideration to gauge ideology 
and to determine political party affiliation, in addition to the number of individuals in each 
congressional district without health insurance prior to the passage of the Affordable Care Act and 
the median household income for each congressional district for the year 2010. Lastly, the margin 
by which the legislator won the 2008 election and the total percent of votes he or she received of 
those who voted in each congressional district will be considered to determine how safe the seat 
would have been considered in the upcoming election. Logistic regression analysis was performed 
to determine how these variables impacted how a Representative voted.  
Literature Review: 
 Previous research sought to determine how significant an impact financial contributions to 
Congressmen are in determining how he or she will vote by focusing on the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the most-
favored nation (MFN) status of China. (Baldwin and Magee, 1998) Political Action Committees 
(PACs) tend to support legislators who are likely to support bills which align with that group’s 
interests and give money accordingly. Congressmen, who are assumed to maximize chances of 
reelection, require both financial support for campaigns and popular support from constituents in 
order to continue their political careers. After regression analysis, which determined how 
contributions, constituents’ interests, impact on employment, influence of the President, and 
ideology impacted voting determination, overall it was concluded by the researchers that 
contributions are only an effective means by which to influence congressional voting when 
accompanied by vigorous lobbying. Interestingly, the researchers also estimate that special 
benefits awarded by the president can essentially “buy” votes. In addition, economic conditions in 
the legislators’ regions, unemployment, unions, education level of workers, import-oriented vs. 
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export-oriented employment, regional industry, and personal policy views were important 
deciding factors.  
 Steven D. Levitt contributed to the discussion about the utility function for Senators given 
that ideology could not be observed. (Levitt, 1996) He found that voter preferences accounted for 
less than twenty-five percent of the weight of the decision function, and of that weight, supporters’ 
preferences are far more influential than non-supporters’ preferences. This weight fluctuates as 
election season approaches and for Senators with lower levels of certainty of reelection.  
 Levitt notes that since ideology and party lines are so closely correlated, one cannot be 
estimated without controlling for the other without significant omitted variable bias (Levitt, 1996). 
Also, the estimation technique of this paper would be applicable to any roll-call data sets. Baldwin 
and Magee controlled for ideology by collecting data from Senators’ voting records, and it would 
be interesting to apply this method to the roll-call voting estimation technique used by Levitt.  
 James M. Snyder further deals with the party-ideology problem within the United States’ 
Congress. (Snyder, 2000) He quotes Krehbiel in asking, “In casting apparently partisan votes, do 
individual legislators vote with fellow party members in spite of their disagreement about the 
policy in question, or do they vote with fellow party members because of their agreement about 
the policy in question?” Levitt chose to focus on lopsided outcomes to determine ideology, which 
he believed to truly show legislators’ real policy preferences since the outcomes are predictable 
and parties should not have uselessly wasted resources coercing a party line vote. Using these 
estimates, he ran regressions on roll-calls with closer votes. Having thus controlled for preference, 
Snyder concluded that party was an important deciding factor in congressional voting. However, 
one limitation of this study was the shortage of lopsided roll calls in roughly twelve congresses.  
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 An interesting point that Syder makes is that by looking at representatives from the same 
state who belong to different parties, it is possible to see how much weight their individual parties 
have on their voting preferences, assuming they have the same constituency. (Snyder, 2000) He 
estimates that roughly one quarter of the decision is based on party in these cases. He also suggests 
using the procedure from this paper that in order to determine the influence of interest groups by 
including some measure of the groups’ standing across constituencies in the second-step 
regressions.  
Theory: 
 The equation estimated for this model was: 
DiACAVOTE = β0 + β1MONEY + β2IDEOLOGY + β3NoHEALTHINSURANCE + 
β4PERCENTOFVOTES + β5INCOME + β6ELECTIONMARGIN + ε 
  The dependent variable of this study is a dummy variable where a value of 1 corresponds 
to a yes vote for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and a value of 0 indicates a no 
vote. Monetary Contributions flagged as originating somewhere in the Health Industry are 
expected to also have a negative coefficient since it was widely known that Health professionals 
and lobbyists gave large campaign contributions to Republicans to stop the act from passing. Party 
Affiliation, which assigned a value of 0 for members of the House who were identified as 
Democrats and a value of 1 for those who were identified as Republicans, is expected to have a 
negative coefficient, since the Affordable Care Act was widely opposed by members of the 
Republican Party. It is anticipated that higher values for the percent of the population in each 
district without health insurance will result in a positive coefficient, since a larger number of 
uninsured constituents will result in more political pressure ot pass a bill which would provide 
coverage. A higher ideology score is anticipated to result in positive coefficients because the higher 
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the ideology score, the more liberal-leaning the Representative is perceived to be and therefore the 
more liberal the constituency is, which will place a higher pressure on the representative to vote 
with that ideology. It is also expected that lower values for median household income will result 
in positive coefficients because lower income districts are expected to be more in favor of the 
Affordable Care Act, resulting in pressure on the representative to vote in favor of the bill. Lastly, 
it is expected that higher election margins and greater percentages of votes won in the election of 
2008 will result in negative coefficients, since these seats should be considered “safe” and the 
Representatives will not feel pressured to vote for the act in order to be reelected.    
Data: 
 Data on the House of Representatives’ party affiliation and vote on the Affordable Care 
Act was acquired from GovTrack (H.R. 3590 (111th), 2010). Figures on the total monetary 
contributions a Representative received from any group affiliated with the Health industry came 
from the Center for Responsive Politics. The percentage of people in each congressional district 
without Health Insurance was originally obtained from “The Uninsured by State and 
Congressional District,” written by David Newman (2011). Data on the median household income 
for 2010 was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. Ideology scores for each House of 
Representatives Member was computed by the Americans for Democratic Action (Voting 
Records, 2010). Data on the victory margins and total percent of votes received by each candidate 
during the 2008 election was compiled by Lorraine C. Miller, the clerk of the House of 
Representatives (2009).  
Model: 
 A binomial logit model was used in this study since the dependent variable was a dummy 
variable. The logit’s dependent variable was whether or not each representative voted in favor of 
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the Affordable Care Act. The independent variables were the total dollar amount of monetary 
contributions received by each representative while the 111th Congress was in session that 
originated in the health sector, representatives’ political parties, the percent of people in each 
district living without health insurance in the year before the bill was voted on, the margin by 
which each representative won the 2008 election over the runner up, the percent of votes each 
representative received in their congressional district in the 2008 election, the median household 
income of each congressional district for 2009, and the score of each representative’s ideology as 
measured by the Americans for Democratic Action. 
 The logit regression was then rerun omitting the variable “party” because under-
identification occurred from the inclusion of a variable which perfectly predicted failure to vote in 
the affirmative for the bill for all Republicans. The controversial nature of this piece of legislation 
led to a largely party-line vote, in which every Republican member of the House of Representatives 
voted no. This under-identification removed 171 observations from the sample, which 
compromised the estimated coefficients. Binomial logit models work best with samples which 
have close to or over 500 observations, which was no longer the case in this study when the party 
variable was included.  
 Then, a second logit regression was run that reinstated the party variable and only included 
data from the members of the House identified as Democrats. Due to the party-line nature of the 
vote, the results were less informative when the Republican members were included. While the 
ACA still had very little variation within the Democratic party, there were 34 Democrats who did 
not vote on the party line and voted against the bill. This deviation allows economic analysis to 
determine what variable were most important in that decision and was therefore far more 
enlightening. 
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 The percent change in the probability a member of the House would vote yes on the 
Affordable Care act was measured by obtaining the marginal effects from the original logit 
regressions. The marginal effects transform the log value of the original coefficients into the 
change in probability that the Representatives will vote yes on the bill that results from a one unit 
change in an independent variable. 
 The McFadden R2 was used as a measure of overall fit for this model. The first regression 
equation had a Pseudo R2 of 0.8814, showing this model accounted for all but 12% of the variance 
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% Without Health 
Insurance 2009 0.085 
 (1.06) 
% of Votes Received -1.335 
 (-0.19) 
Median Household 
Income in $10,000s -0.165 
 (-0.66) 




z statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 
Full Regression Results: Appendix A 
  
 In order to interpret the results of this model, the marginal effects for the logit results were 
computed. The marginal coefficients provide the change in probability of obtaining a value of 1 in 
a dummy dependent variable, in this case a yes vote on the Affordable Care Act, based on a one 
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  (-1.44)    
Ideology 0.407*** 
  (12.27) 
% Without Health 
Insurance 2009 0.198 
  (1.06) 
% of Votes Received -3.12 
  (-0.19)    
Median Household 
Income in $10,000s -0.384 
  (-0.67)    
Election Margin in 
10,000s 0.040 
  (-0.11) 
N 418 
z statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 
Full Regression Results: Appendix A 
 
  
 The variable party was omitted by Stata in the first logit regression because under-
identification occurred. Of the 178 Republicans in the 111th Congress, every one voted against the 
Affordable Care Act. Since a value of 0, which indicated a no vote, perfectly predicted failure in 
the model for Republicans, the variable was not useful for determining which factors were 
influential in determining how a delegate voted.  
 A second logit regression was run to determine what affect the independent variable had 
on the decision-making process of the Democratic members. Since there was variation in the way 
that the members of the Democratic Party voted led to more interesting results, though the smaller 
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sample size means that the results may not be as reliable. In the second logit regression, party was 
omitted because only the Democrat Representatives were considered. 
Table 4 





  (-2.10)    
Ideology 0.638*** 
  (-13.04) 
% Without Health 
Insurance 2009 0.351 
  1.11 
% of Votes Received -8.7 
  -0.34 
Median Household 
Income in $10,000s 0.235 
  -0.26 
Election Margin in 
10,000s -0.27 
  -0.11 
N 246 
z statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 
 
 For every $10,000 increase in the total monetary contributions a candidate received from 
health sector interest groups between their election in 2008 and 2010, there was a 0.184% decrease 
in the probability that the representative voted in favor of the Affordable Care Act. These results 
were significant and were consistent with the hypothesis of this study. Since the majority of health 
campaign contribution was spent to stop the enactment of the Affordable Care Act, it was expected 
that the impact on voting would be negative. One explanation for this variable being statistically 
significant when monetary contributions was not significant in the original regression is that 
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money contributed to the campaigns of Democrats was more effective in eliciting a no vote since 
the Republican Representatives were all going to vote no regardless of money. 
 For every $10,000 increase in the median household income of the ith congressional district 
in 2010, the probability that the representative will vote in favor of the Affordable Care Act 
increased by .235%, all other variables held constant. This does not support the hypothesis that 
income and ACA vote are inversely correlated, but the result was statistically insignificant. 
 For every 1% increase in the percent of the population of the ith congressional district living 
without health insurance, the probability that the Representatives of the Democratic party will vote 
in favor of the Affordable Care Act increases by .351%, all other variables held constant. This 
result supports the hypothesis that the percent of individuals without health insurance and votes on 
the Affordable Care Act would be positively related. However, the results were not statistically 
significant. 
 A one unit increase in ideology score in the ith representative resulted in a .638% increase 
in the probability that he or she voted in favor of the bill, all other variables held constant. This 
was consistent with the hypothesis that the more liberal the Representative, the more likely they 
would be to support the Affordable Care Act. These results were statistically significant. 
 A 10,000 vote increase in the victory margin of the winning candidate over the runner-up 
led to a .27% decrease in the probability that that representative voted yes for the Affordable Care 
Act. This result was consistent that the hypothesis that “safer” seats would feel less pressure to 
vote for the bill and be less inclined to rock the boat by helping to put in place such a controversial 
policy. However, this result was not statistically significant. 
 A 1% increase in the percent of total votes the ith candidate received in their congressional 
district led to an 8.7% decrease in the likelihood that the representative would cast a favorable vote 
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for the bill. This result was not consistent with the hypothesis stated for this study, but the result 
was not statistically significant.  
 The second logit regression equation had a pseudo R2 of 0.7251. This decrease in the 
overall fit can be accounted for by the lack of inclusion of Republican House of Representatives 
members. Also, the sample size decreased from 418 in the first regression to 246 in the second. 
Binomial Logit regressions function best with sample sizes close to 500 observations, so this 
drastic decrease in the sample size can be credited for some decrease in overall fit. Again, the 
marginal effects were obtained from these results.  
 Democrats received average campaign contributions from the health sector that amounted 
to $135,934.30 per representative (Appendix D). In comparison, the average Republican member 
of the House received $137,928.30 (Appendix C), which is not drastically different from the 
amount received by Democrats. Since 34 Democrats voted against the piece of legislation, it is 
possible to observe the difference in those who voted for the act and those who voted against it. 
Democrats who voted for the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act received 
an average of $133,151.20 (Appendix F), while their fellow Democrats who opposed the bill 
received an average of $152,633.30 (Appendix E), nearly $20,000 per person more. Without 
knowing what purpose interest groups had in mind when they contributed to Representatives’ 
campaigns, the assumption can be made from the literature that overall, health sector interest 
groups wanted to prevent the ACA from passing. In order to accomplish this, the summary 
statistics suggest that Democrats who had lower ideology scores who were perceived to be more 
conservative were targeted by these interest groups as being open to voting against their party and 
therefore received more monetary contributions.  
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 Based on the results from this study, we can conclude that monetary contributions were 
statistically significant in the process by which members of the House of Representatives chose to 
vote on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act when there was some variation in the voting 
patterns of Representatives. However, personal ideology was a factor heavily considered by 
members that was significant, even at the 97.5% significance level. These inferences can be 
extended to describe the process through which congressmen make decisions on bills.  
 While the factor which Representatives appear to consider the most heavily is personal 
ideology and monetary contributions also play a role in determining how they will vote. The other 
explanatory variables were insignificant and did not appear to seriously influence the voting 
inclinations of members of the House of Representatives.  
 The conclusion that ideology is the factor that Representatives most heavily consider when 
deciding how to vote is a positive one, because constituents elect delegates whom they believe will 
best represent their interests and who they believe most aligns with their personal beliefs. 
However, the significance of monetary contributions tells a less optimistic tale. While campaign 
contributions seem to only change a vote when the Representative is open-minded and does not 
have an extreme personal ideology, the results suggest that House of Representatives votes are for 
sale in some situations. 
 However, the Affordable Care Act was very politically polarizing and largely came down 
to a party line vote, with some exceptions from the Democratic Party. This negated the Party 
variable since the dummy variables for vote and party were too similar to be compared. It is 
possible that when considering other votes which are less divisive, and when the party variable 
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can be considered by data analysis software, the results would more accurately reflect how 
legislators make voting decisions.  
 There was a high degree of correlation between ideology and vote on the Affordable Care 
Act, which may have impacted the overall efficiency of the coefficients. Also, there was some 
correlation between the percent of votes a representative receive in their congressional district and 
the margin by which they won the election. This was to be expected given the close relationship 
of the two variables. (Appendix G) 
 In future research, bills which have some voting variation within party should be 
considered in order to obtain reliable coefficient which incorporate data from both major political 
parties. Also, additional relevant variables should be added to the model for a more robust result. 
For example, polling data on the popularity of the potential impacts of the proposed legislation 
within each congressional district and the approval ratings of the current administration.    
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       incomein10000s    -.0038416    .005761    -0.67   0.505    -.0151328    .0074497
electionmarginin1000s     .0000399   .0003748     0.11   0.915    -.0006947    .0007745
       precentofvotes     -.031179   .1642304    -0.19   0.849    -.3530648    .2907068
             ideology     .0040719   .0003318    12.27   0.000     .0034216    .0047222
                 nohi     .0019788    .001869     1.06   0.290    -.0016843    .0056419
contributionsin10000s    -.0008548   .0005931    -1.44   0.150    -.0020172    .0003077
                                                                                       
                             dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                   Delta-method
                                                                                       
               incomein10000s
dy/dx w.r.t. : contributionsin10000s nohi ideology precentofvotes electionmarginin1000s
Expression   : Pr(acavote), predict()
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                        Number of obs     =        418
. margins, dydx(*)
                                                                                       
                _cons    -9.855347   4.276448    -2.30   0.021    -18.23703   -1.473663
       incomein10000s    -.1645415   .2482055    -0.66   0.507    -.6510153    .3219324
electionmarginin1000s     .0017085   .0160477     0.11   0.915    -.0297444    .0331615
       precentofvotes    -1.335459   7.035833    -0.19   0.849    -15.12544    12.45452
             ideology     .1744094   .0272989     6.39   0.000     .1209045    .2279144
                 nohi     .0847549    .080219     1.06   0.291    -.0724716    .2419813
contributionsin10000s    -.0366109   .0259436    -1.41   0.158    -.0874593    .0142376
                                                                                       
              acavote        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                       
Log likelihood = -34.371664                     Pseudo R2         =     0.8814
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(6)        =     510.64
Logistic regression                             Number of obs     =        418
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -34.371664  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -34.371664  
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -34.371716  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -34.39126  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -36.168657  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -45.452295  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -289.69246  
> s
. logit acavote contributionsin10000s nohi ideology precentofvotes electionmarginin1000s  incomein10000
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       precentofvotes     .0869672   .2538144     0.34   0.732       -.4105    .5844343
electonmarginin10000s    -.0027015   .0057703    -0.47   0.640    -.0140112    .0086082
       incomein10000s     .0023525   .0090752     0.26   0.795    -.0154345    .0201395
contributionsin10000s    -.0018427   .0008765    -2.10   0.036    -.0035607   -.0001248
             ideology     .0063829   .0004895    13.04   0.000     .0054236    .0073423
                 nohi     .0035068   .0031589     1.11   0.267    -.0026845    .0096982
                                                                                       
                             dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                   Delta-method
                                                                                       
               precentofvotes
dy/dx w.r.t. : nohi ideology contributionsin10000s incomein10000s electonmarginin10000s
Expression   : Pr(acavote), predict()
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                        Number of obs     =        246
. margins, dydx(*)
                                                                                       
                _cons    -14.71891   5.599268    -2.63   0.009    -25.69327   -3.744541
       precentofvotes     2.722209   7.951265     0.34   0.732    -12.86198     18.3064
electonmarginin10000s     -.084561   .1812542    -0.47   0.641    -.4398128    .2706907
       incomein10000s     .0736372   .2837769     0.26   0.795    -.4825553    .6298296
contributionsin10000s    -.0576809   .0291082    -1.98   0.048    -.1147319   -.0006299
             ideology     .1997957   .0355828     5.61   0.000     .1300547    .2695367
                 nohi     .1097693    .099353     1.10   0.269    -.0849591    .3044977
                                                                                       
              acavote        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                       
Log likelihood = -27.163324                     Pseudo R2         =     0.7251
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(6)        =     143.31
Logistic regression                             Number of obs     =        246
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -27.163324  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -27.163324  
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -27.163517  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -27.234322  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -29.657373  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -42.683013  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -98.81901  
> s if party == 0
. logit acavote nohi ideology contributionsin10000s incomein10000s electonmarginin10000s precentofvote
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C. Summary if Republican 
 
 











electi~1000s          173    76.65015    46.50698          0    274.567
income~1000s          176    68.57571    16.11406     21.431    123.991
                                                                       
contri~1000s          176    135.5773    159.9019          0       1100
precentofv~s          174    .6255288    .1041282   .3862169          1
electionma~n          172    77095.79    46270.83        350     274567
    ideology          174    5.833333    10.97927          0        100
   reelected          176    .8636364    .3441534          0          1
                                                                       
      income          176    68575.71    16114.06      21431     123991
        nohi          176     14.7608    4.714415        5.6       30.5
monetaryco~s          173    137928.3      160276          0    1100000
     acavote          176           0           0          0          0
       party          176           1           0          1          1
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize if party==1
electi~1000s          245    100.5191    56.74752          0    242.404
income~1000s          255    67.41609    19.11288      34.02    137.003
                                                                       
contri~1000s          252    135.9343    120.8648          2      725.1
precentofv~s          247    .6727317    .1223223   .4301275   .9997008
electionma~n          243    101346.4    56237.91        727     242404
    ideology          254    83.83858    18.37062          0        100
   reelected          255    .7215686    .4491084          0          1
                                                                       
      income          255    67416.09    19112.88      34020     137003
        nohi          255     15.2302    6.575916        3.2       38.5
monetaryco~s          252    135934.3    120864.8       2000     725100
     acavote          255    .8588235    .3488883          0          1
       party          255           0           0          0          0
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize if party==0
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F.  Summary if Democrat and Voted Yes 
 
  
electi~1000s           34    80.28362     62.5701       1.79    225.335
income~1000s           36    62.39472    20.07199     42.503    130.903
                                                                       
contri~1000s           36    152.6333    119.3878       11.9      462.3
precentofv~s           34    .6378934    .1446781   .4301275   .9997008
electionma~n           34    80283.62     62570.1       1790     225335
    ideology           36    49.02778     18.8914          0         95
   reelected           36    .3888889    .4944132          0          1
                                                                       
      income           36    62394.72    20071.99      42503     130903
        nohi           36    14.28333    4.200714        3.5       21.8
monetaryco~s           36    152633.3    119387.8      11900     462300
     acavote           36           0           0          0          0
       party           36           0           0          0          0
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize if party==0 & acavote==0
electi~1000s          211    103.7798    55.22196          0    242.404
income~1000s          219    68.24152     18.8705      34.02    137.003
                                                                       
contri~1000s          216    133.1512    121.1591          2      725.1
precentofv~s          213    .6782927    .1178069   .4351859   .9995421
electionma~n          209    104772.9    54536.55        727     242404
    ideology          218    89.58716    10.08326         55        100
   reelected          219    .7762557    .4177074          0          1
                                                                       
      income          219    68241.52     18870.5      34020     137003
        nohi          219    15.38584    6.883182        3.2       38.5
monetaryco~s          216    133151.2    121159.1       2000     725100
     acavote          219           1           0          1          1
       party          219           0           0          0          0
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize if party==0 & acavote==1
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G. Correlation  
 
  
elect~10000s    -0.2130   0.2382   0.0045   0.2463   0.8264  -0.0689  -0.1365   1.0000
incom~10000s     0.0408   0.0052  -0.3729   0.0244  -0.2412   0.1345   1.0000
contr~10000s     0.0183  -0.0406  -0.0963  -0.0219  -0.1018   1.0000
precentofv~s    -0.1984   0.2164   0.2810   0.2215   1.0000
    ideology    -0.9267   0.9223   0.0142   1.0000
        nohi    -0.0310   0.0516   1.0000
     acavote    -0.8483   1.0000
       party     1.0000
                                                                                      
                  party  acavote     nohi ideology precen~s c~10000s i~10000s e~10000s
(obs=418)
. corr
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